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Professor Krasner identifies the problem of badly-governed states as
one that exists today without a historical comparator. These are states such
as Haiti and those in sub-Saharan Africa that are effectively empty shells
without a functioning form of legal governance. Professor Krasner argues
that existing policy tools of governance assistance and transitional ad-
ministration have proven inadequate to address the enormous range of
problems generated by poor levels of governance. He posits an alternate
approach of "shared sovereignty" to allow the engagement of external
actors in specific aspects of domestic governance.
Although Professor Krasner's opening analysis was relatively broad,
his preferred model of shared sovereignty was largely put forward in the
context of resource-rich countries, and especially the contemporary is-
sues facing Iraq. In this regard, Professor Krasner's approach implicitly
acknowledges the idea that an abundance of natural resources can be a
curse for developing countries. An over-dependence on a single re-
source can encourage corruption and push the value of a domestic
currency uncompetitively high, leading to poor economic growth and
enormous distributional inequities evident in countries such as Nigeria
and Venezuela. Professor Krasner's model of "shared sovereignty"
would see the revenues from exploitation of natural resources such as
oil and gas paid to trusts, whose purpose would be to introduce better
levels of governance in those countries. Those trusts, in turn, would en-
gage external actors to assist in developing specific aspects of domestic
governance. He argues that having a state "sign off" on such an ar-
rangement would legitimize this arrangement and act as an adequate
response to the idea of loss of domestic sovereignty.
Professor Krasner's model is a useful and promising starting point,
in that it engages contemporary theories of economic development that
emphasize the need for a given level of institutional investment and ca-
pacity.' In this regard, some resource-rich Latin American nations, like
Chile, Peru and Brazil, have managed to avoid the so-called resource
curse through concerted efforts at investment and institutional develop-
ment. Yet, Professor Krasner's model raises a number of intriguing
1. But see Jeff Madrick, Far from a 'Curse,' Natural Resources Can Form the Basis
for Economic Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at C2 (contesting the argument that poor
institutional development is intrinsic to nations with oil and other minerals).
2. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Govern-
ments?, 106 J. POL. ECON. 997 (1998); Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth:
What They Are and How to Acquire Them, STUD. COMP. INT'L. DEv. 3 (Fall 2000).
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questions. An initial fundamental issue is the types of external actors
that would be involved in the shared sovereignty model. Are these to be
multinational corporate entities, developmental bodies such as United
Nations Development Program, or members of the broad universe of
NGOs, to name but a few?
At a minimum, the role of the external actors that were to partici-
pate in such a model would need to be carefully circumscribed. In this
regard, it is worth considering the important lessons to emerge from the
program of structural adjustment loans negotiated by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1970s and 1980s.' The doctrine of struc-
tural adjustment meant that a debtor country applying for financial
assistance from the IMF had to commit itself to a number of stringent
economic and legal reforms. The neo-liberal "Washington Consensus"
advocated by the IMF emphasized trade liberalization and a greatly re-
duced role for the state in the economy, through deregulation and
privatization programs. A common idea behind this program was that
supplied laws on corporate and financial frameworks-once incorpo-
rated into the domestic legal system-would improve the existing legal
framework and further economic development. It is now understood that
this process of supplying laws from the outside is problematic on a
number of fronts. Law and legal frameworks are in a sense cognitive,
and the application and success of those rules is a function of their per-
ception by users and enforcers in the receiving country.4 Professor
Krasner's model is clearly different, given its emphasis on creating insti-
tutions within countries such as Iraq, as opposed to the implicit hostility
to state involvement evident in the IMF's structural adjustment program.
However, both approaches seem at some level to involve the transport of
forms of legal governance to the receiving country. While this may be
practically necessary, the shared sovereignty model should not in its
emphasis on the involvement of external actors, ignore the vital need for
domestic involvement in law and institutional creation.
A related issue is that of the legitimacy of such a proposal from the
perspective of citizens within the state concerned. Professor Krasner
argues that having a state "sign off' on such a model would be an ade-
quate response to the idea of loss of sovereignty. Yet, it is worth
recalling the instructive lessons of the messy process of decolonization
instituted in the aftermath of the Second World War. The countries that
emerged from this process demanded not only political, but also eco-
3. For an insightful account of the doctrine of structural adjustment, see ROBERT
GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER 313-17 (2001).
4. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Coun-
tries, 4 G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 8 (2000).
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nomic independence. Indeed, foreign investment in particular came to
be seen as a proxy for colonialism, leading to waves of expropriation of
foreign-owned assets throughout much of the developing world. There
has, of course, been a pendulum shift in developing country attitudes
toward foreign investment in the last decade. Nonetheless, there remains
a certain sensitivity, especially in resource-rich countries, of undue in-
fluence of foreign interests on their economic affairs. Of course,
Professor Krasner's model itself offers a response to these concerns, in
that its entire purpose is to use revenues from resource exploitation in
the creation of a domestic legal framework. As such, the goals of his
model are diametrically opposed to the profit maximization goals of
most foreign investors. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that given
its laudable goals, the "shared sovereignty" model would be automati-
cally accepted and understood by the ordinary citizenry of Iraq. At an
absolute minimum, the architects of such a model should invest heavily
in communicating its goals as part of an overall bottom-up approach to
legitimization.
The importance of building a sense of legitimacy for the project is
also bolstered by the lessons of the structural adjustment loans negoti-
ated by the IMF. At a superficial level, the countries involved in those
loans clearly "signed off' on the program of law reform as a precondi-
tion to receiving needed financial assistance. Yet, this consent was
provided under duress, given the large balance of payment deficits run
by many developing countries at the time. The enormous human suffer-
ing to result from the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has been blamed by
many countries in East Asia on the overly strong liberalization program
mandated by the IMF. This has led to a sense that--despite the "sign
off"-the conditionality program was an entirely inappropriate interfer-
ence in domestic regulatory sovereignty.
Thus, a final question might be to consider how to build such a
sense of local ownership in the "shared sovereignty" model. A promis-
ing starting point might be to consider the use of the Internet in this
endeavor. This, of course, raises the preliminary issue of existing levels
of telecommunications infrastructure and Internet access in a country
such as Iraq. To the extent, however, that the occupying authority estab-
lishes a certain level of access within Iraq, the Internet would seem to
offer a two-fold advantage as a tool in the process of bottom-up legiti-
mization of the "shared sovereignty" model. Firstly, it is an
extraordinarily successful tool for communication of the goals of the
project. Even more crucially, however, the Internet offers the possibility
of direct engagement by a host of individual actors in the law-making
process of the "shared sovereignty" model itself. The relative anonymity
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of exchange of ideas through the Internet offers a particularly useful
psychological tool for encouraging participation in a country, such as
Iraq, where there is no real public culture of engagement, given its re-
cent history of totalitarian oppression. The possibilities of the Internet
are not intended as a simple answer to the likely challenges of legitimi-
zation of the "shared sovereignty" model. They are, however, a useful
starting point to address these challenges in all their complexities.
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